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JESUS VASQUEZ, Appellant, v. ROBERT ALAMEDA 
et al., Respondents. 
[1] Automobiles-Appeal-Harmless Error-Instructions.-In an 
act.ion for injuries sustained by a man who, after join-
ing the owner of a non operable automobile and a third man in 
pushing the car from its position of safety on private property 
onto a three-lane highway, and after flagging another auto-
mobile which stopped in the center lane and started to back 
behind the stalled car in order to push it, found himself under 
a truck which came from the rear, alleged errors in instructing 
the jury, particularly in overemphasizing plaintiff's burden 
of proof, did not result in a miscarriage of justice and did not 
warrant a reversal, where the evidence amply supported an im-
plied finding that plaintiff's conduct in actively participating 
in moving an inert object from a place of safety on private 
property to a place of danger on the public highway, where 
it constituted an obstruction to traffic, was a proximate con-
tributing cause of the accident which barred recovery. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Monte-
rey County. Stanley Lawson, Judge. Affirmed. 
Action by pedestrian for damages for personal lDJuries 
suffered in a highway accident. Judgment for defendants 
affirmed. 
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Automobiles, § 412 et seq. 
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Edward J. Niland for Appellant. 
Hoge, Fenton & Jon~s, Lewis L. Fenton, Campbell, Custer, 
Warburton & Britton, Alfred B. Britton, Jr., W. R. Dunn, 
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SCHAUER, J.-Plaintifl' appeals from an adverse judgment 
entered pursuant to a jury's verdict in his action to recover for 
personal injuries suffered in a highway accident. We have 
concluded that plaintiff's claims of error in the jury instruc-
tions are immaterial and need not be discussed because the 
uncontradicted evidence overwhelmingly supports the jury's 
implied determination that plaintiff's own conduct at the least 
constituted negligence which proximately contributed to his 
injuries. Hence, no miscarriage of justice is shown and the 
judgment should be affirmed. 
At about 1 o'clock on a March morning in 1954 plaintiff met 
one Vargas in a parking lot near the city of Santa Clara. On 
the parking lot was a Plymouth automobile owned by Vargas. 
The automobile was not in operable condition; its engine 
could not be started. Rain was falling at the time. Plaintiff, 
Vargas, and a third man joined in pushing the nOll operable 
automobile from its position of safety on the private property 
onto the highway, which at that point had three lanes, plus 
hard shoulders, and flat areas of dirt or gravel beyond the 
shoulders. The highway was straight for at least a half mile 
in each direction, and the posted speed limit was 45 miles an 
hour. The three men pushed the Plymouth, with its lights 
on, into the right hand, eastbound, lane of the highway where 
they allowed it to come to rest. 
Plaintiff thereupon walked a short distance to the rear of the 
Plymouth and flagged down a car driven by defendant Green-
ley. Greenley stopped in the center lane, to the left of the 
Plymouth, and then started to back into the right hand lane 
behind the Plymouth in . order to push it. While backing 
Greenley saw a truck driven by defendant Rutkowski coming 
from behind on the outer shoulder. Afraid that the truck 
was so wide it could not clear vehicleR or objects in the right 
hand lane, Greenley stopped his car partly in the center 
lane and partly in the lane to the ri~ht. Rutkowski, who 
bad seen the two cars occupying the right hand and center 
lanes, had' decided to pass them on the shoulder. As he passed 
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the Plymouth he saw plaintiff standing behind it in the rG;i:~~(­
'P1s:, to the right. 
Defendant Alameda, driving in the same direction behind 
Rutkowski, saw red tail Hghts in the right hand lane ahead of 
him and other lights off to the right. He moved into the 
center lane to pass and did not see Greenley's car, partly 
in that lane, until it was too late to stop. He struck the side 
of Greenley's car, shoving it into the Plymouth, which was 
in turn moved forward by the impact. When Rutkowski heard 
the crash, he stopped his truck a short distance ahead of the 
Plymouth. Plaintiff testified that as he was standing on the 
shoulder next to the Plymouth after Greenley had started to 
back, he saw the lights of an approaching vehicle about 15 
to 20 feet away in the right hand lane of the ~llighway. The 
next thing he remembered was coming to his senses as he lay 
on his stomach with part of the left rear wheel of Rutkowski's 
truck pressing on his left side and shoulder. 
[1] As grounds for reversal plaintiff complains of various :'. 
asserted errors of the court in instructing the jury, and urges 
in particular that the plaintiff's burden of proof was improp-
erly and prejudicially overemphasized. However, the basic 
facts recited hereinabove make it altogether clear that plaintiff 
deliberately and actively participated in moving an inert 
object-Vargas' nonoperable automobile-from a place of 
safety on private property to a place of danger on the public 
highway where it obviously constituted an obstruction to 
traffic. Whether, as has been suggested, plaintiff thereby aided 
and abetted in creating a public nuisance (see Oiv. Code, 
§§ 3479, 3480; Pen. Code, § 370) we need not determine be-
cause, on any reasonable view of the evidence, the implied 
finding of the jury that his conduct was a proximate contribu-
ting cause of the accident which barred recovery, is amply 
supported. 
If his conduct be regarded as creating a nuisance 
plaintiff's liability to others for damages proximately caused 
by it would be, insofar as his own act is concerned, absolu1e 
(Stockton Automobile Co. v. Confer (1908), 154 Cal. 402, 
405 [97 P. 881]; Curtis v. Kastner (1934),220 Cal. 185, 188-
191 [3, 4] [30 P.2d 26]; Calder v. City &; County of San 
Francisco (1942), 50 Cal.App.2d 837. S3P !1] [123 P.2d 
897]) ; i.e., anyone injured by plaintiff's unlawful act could, 
.roleS!; barred by such other's own contributory negligence, 
recover from plaintiff as from an insurer. It is, therefore, 
manifest that such plaintiff, if we take the view that he 
) 
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participated in creating a nuisance, may not recover against 
anyone for injuries, to the causation of which the nuisance 
proximately contributed, even though a defendant's negligence 
may have also contribu'ted proximately to the accident. The 
result, of course, must be the same if plaintiff's conduct be 
regarded as mere negligence which contributed proximately to 
cause the accident. 
Considering the entire record we are ~atisfied that the 
jury's implied finding-that plaintiff was at the least guilty 
of negligence which contributed proximately to cause his 
injuries-is clearly and overwhelmingly supported. It fol-
lows that, even if we assume the errors urged by plaintiff, 
no miscarriage of justice is shown and a reversal is not permis-
sible under the limitations of section 4% of article VI of the 
California Constitution. (See People v. Watson (1956), 46 
Ca1.2d 818, 836 [299 P.2d 243] ; Vallejo &; Northern R. R. Co. 
v. Reed Orchard Co. (1915), 169 Cal. 545, 554 [147 P. 238}.) 
The judgment is affirmed. 
Shenk, J., Spence, J., and McComb, J., concurred. 
TRAYNOR, J.-I dissent on the ground that numerous 
seriously erroneous instructions operated to deny plaintiff a 
fair trial in a fact-context so complicated that the jury could 
have as plausibly found for plaintiff as against him. The 
pile-up of erroneous instructions matched the pile-up on the 
highway, and their total effect was bound to be prejudicial 
when the facts themselves invited so many possibilities of 
conjecture as to negligence and causation. 
Even in fact situations less obscure than this one the court 
need not find that it was more probable than not that errors 
influenced the jury to deem them prejudicial. It must deem 
them prejudicial if it finds it not improbable that had they 
been absent another result 'would have been reached. Other-
wise it would be declaring errors harmless in the face of 
a substantial chance that they were not, thereby depriving the 
appellant of the trial to which he was entitled. "[T]he fact 
that there exists at least such an equal balance of reasonable 
probabilities [as to leave the court in serious doubt as to 
whether error influenced the jury] necessarily means that the 
court is of the opinion 'that it is reasonably probable that a 
result more favorable to the appealing party would have 
been reached in the absence of the error.'" (People v. 
Watson, 46 Ca1.2d 818,837 [299 P.2d 243].) 
) 
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Obviously we must assume that juries conscientiously heed 
instructions given them by the trial court. Were we to assume 
the contrary, apprllate review of instructiulls wou~d be mean-
ingless, since no instrl1ctions could then be deemed preju-
dicial. 
I t also bears emphasis that except when the evidence com-
pels only one conclusion, it is for the jury to determine the 
issues of negligence and causation. In ruling on the prejudi-
cial effect of error, we do not determine how we would have 
decided these issues had the decision been ours. We do not 
hold error harmless merely because we would have reached 
the same conclusion as that reached by the jury, for we are 
not the triers of fact. Our task is to review the whole record 
and to determine in that context whether there was a sub-
stantial chance that error influenced the jury in reaching 
its verdict. 
The determination of the majority that it is unnecessary to 
consider errors in the instructions on issues other than con-
tributory negligence necessarily rests on the conclusion either 
that it is improbable that the jury decided the case on any 
issue other than contributory negligence, or that the evidence 
on that issue so overwhelmingly supported the result as to 
make any other result improbable. 
I find neither of these conclusions tenable. There was 
substantial evidence to support a verdict for plaintiff on other 
issues. On the issue of contributory negligence, the jury 
could reasonably have concluded that plaintiff was not con-
tributively negligent. It is therefore impossible to determine 
whether the jury reached a verdict based solely on that issue 
or whether it followed erroneous instructions on the issues 
of negligence and causation. Where the uncertainty surround· 
ing the result looms so large, errors perforce also loom large. 
Anyone of them might have influenced the jury in reaching a 
verdict that cannot be clearly related to any single issue, 
whether of contributory negligence, negligence, or causation. 
To begin with contributory negligence, how can we be sure 
that a jury has found anything unreasonable in the conduct of 
pushing a disabled vehicle on a highway to start it when the 
traffic is light, the road straight, and the visibilty good enough 
to reveal lights of all the vehicles involved T To push a car 
along a highway, even at night, does not constitute negligence 
as a matter of law (Shannon v. Thomas, 57 Cal.App.2d 187, 
194-195 [134 P.2d 522); Wright v. Ponitz, 44 Ca1.App.2d 
215,220 [112 P.2d 25]), and the jury and the trial court, in 
) 
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the first and second of the foregoing cases respectively, deter-
mined that such conduct is not negligence.1 A comparable 
determination in this case would be at least a reasonable 
probability, not a mere possibility. 
This probability is not diminished by the possible inference 
that plaintiff aided and abetted Vargas in violating section 
582 of the Vehicle Code. Although we can only conjecture, it 
is reasonable to assume that the jury was concerned with the 
total conduct of plaintiff, not simply with the isolated act of 
stopping the car. It is questionable that it created greater 
hazard when stopped than when pushed. Nothing in the 
evidence would compel a jury to infer that plaintiff aided and 
abetted Vargas in violating the statute. While at the wheel 
of his own car, Vargas directed where it should go. Plaintiff 
was only pushing, and when the car stopped, the other man 
who had also been pushing went back to the restaurant. 
Plaintiff could not remove the car from the highway without 
Vargas'8 cooperation. The burden of proof on contributory 
negligence was on defendants; yet they made no effort to 
establish that plaintiff and Vargas planned to stop or leave 
the car on the highway if they could not get it started or that 
Vargas wanted plaintiff to assist him in moving his car onto 
the shoulder or was willing that he should do so. The jury 
could thus reasonably conclude that defendants did not sustain 
their burden of proving that plaintiff violated section 582, 
and that plaintiff had no alternative to acquiescing in Vargas's 
decision to stop the car on the highway to await additional 
help. We cannot ignore this probability. 
We are then bound to consider whether error was prejudi-
cial in the instructions on the other issues of negligence and I 
causation on which the verdict could turn. The evidence was I 
sufficient to support findings against Greenley, Rutkowski, and 
lThese cases also make clear that the nonnegligent use of the highway 
to start a ear by pushing it does not constitute the creation or mainte· 
nance of a public nuisance. I'enal Code section 370 provides that" Any· 
thing which .•• unlawfully obstructs the free passa~e or use ... of ..• 
any ..• highway, is a public nuisance." (See also Civ. Code ~~ 3479, 
3480.) The key word in this definition is, of course, the word "unlaw· 
fully." Neither the Shannon nor Wright cases expressly referred to 
nuisance, but there is no magic in that word. Since contributory negli· 
gence was not found in those cases, the conduct involved was necessarily 
found to be a reasonable and therefore lawful use of the highway. As the 
court in the Shannon case pointed out, "It certainly cannot be said 
as a matter of law that the conduct of an automobile drh'er in pushing 
his vehicle along the highway and toward the right-hand curh in an 
effort to start it when his battery failed is not a legitimate and prudent 
use of the highway." (57 Cal.App.2d at 195, italics added.) 
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Alameda on the issues of negligence and proximate cauee.tt 
was for the jury to determine whether Greenley was negligent 
in stopping alongside Vargas's car, thereby blocking both 
lanes available for eastbound traffic, or in attempting to back 
into the right lane in the face of the oncoming truck. In any 
event, plaintiff had no reason to foresee that Greenley might 
be negligent in the aid he rendered. "It is ancient learning 
that one who assumes to act, even though gratuitously, may 
t.hereby become subject to the duty of acting carefully, if he 
acts at all." (Cardozo, J. in Glanzer v. Shepard, 233 N.Y. 
236, 239 [135 N.E. 275, 23 A.L.R. 1425] ; Hayes v. Richfield 
Oil Corp., 38 Ca1.2d 375,384 1240 P.2d 580] ; Perry v. D. J. 
& T. Sullivan, Inc., 219 Cal. 384, 390 [26 P.2d 485] ; Jano/sky 
v. Garland, 42 Cal.App.2d 655, 657 [109 P.2d 750].) Whether 
Rutkowski should have passed on the shoulder and whether 
Alameda should have seen Greenley's car before it was too 
late to stop were also questions for the jury. As to the cause of 
plaintiff's injuries, the jury could reasonably have concluded 
that plaintiff had been hit by Rutkowski's truck, thrown 
against or under it by the collision of the other vehicles, or 
injured by a combination of circumstances. 
The trial court gave the following instruction on assumption 
of risk: 
"One is said to assume a risk when he freely, voluntarily 
and knowingly manifests his assent to dangerous conduct or 
to the creation or maintenance of a dangerous condition, 
and voluntarily exposes himself to that danger, or when he 
knows that a danger exists in either the conduct or condition 
of another, or in the condition, use or operation of property, 
and voluntarily places himself, or remains within the area 
of danger . 
•• One who thus assumed a risk is not entitled to recover 
for damage caused him without intention and which resulted 
from the dangerous condition or conduct to which he thus 
exposed himself . 
•• Distinction should be noted between the assumption of 
risk just described, which bars recovery, and the ordinary 
and necessary acceptance of common risks such as surround 
'.lS all and that lie in the possibility that other persons will 
not perform their duties toward us. As to this latter kind of 
everyday risk,. one will not be barred from recovery for dam-
age by the fact, if it be a fact, that while he, himself, is 
exercising ordinary care, and when there is nothing in the 
circumstances that either cautions him, or would caution a 
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reasonably prudent person in like position, to the contrary, 
he assumes that others will perform their duties toward him 
and acts on that assumption." 
The last sentence of this instruction confuses the defenses 
of contributory negligence and assumption of risk. It errone-
ously suggests that if in the exercise of due care the plaintiff 
would have known of the danger of the defendant's negli-
gence, he has assumed the risk of such conduct. "The defenses 
of assumption of risk and contributory negligence are based 
on different theories. Cont.ributory negligence arises from 
a lack of due care. The defense of assumption of risk, on the 
other hand, will negative liability regardless of the fact that 
plaintiff may have acted with due care. [Citation.] It is 
available when there has been a voluntary acceptance of 
a risk and such acceptance, whether express or implied, has 
been made with knowledge and appreciation of the risk. 
[Citation.] Where the facts are such that the plaintiff must 
have had knowledge of the hazard, the situation is equivalent 
to actual knowledge, and there may be an assumption of risk, 
but where it merely appears that he should or could have dis-
covered the danger by the exercise of ordinary care, the 
defense is contributory negligence and not assumption of 
risk." (Prescott v. Ralphs Grocery 00., 42 Ca1.2d 158, 161· 
162 [265 P.2d 904].) 
Moreover, an instruction on assumption of risk would not 
be proper in any event, for in the circumstances of the case, 
the defense was not available to defendants. "While a per-
son, if fully informed, may assume the risk even though the 
dangerous condition is caused by the negligence of others 
(Prescott v. Ralphs Grocery 00., supra, 42 Cal.2d 158, 162), 
'The plaintiff does not assume the risk of any negligence which 
he has no reason to anticipate, but once he is fully informed 
of it, it is well settled that the risks arising from such negli-
gence may be assumed.' (Prosser on Torts, p. 885.)" (Rogers 
v. Los Angeles Transit Lines, 45 Ca1.2d 414, 419 [289 P.2d 
226}.} Plaintiff may have been aware of hazards that would 
attend any attempt to start the car by pushing it onto the 
highway, and he may have been negligent in exposing himself 
to these hazards. There is no evidence, however, that he knew 
or must have known of the danger of negligent driving on 
the part of defendants, and that he thereby assumed the 
risks created by sU$lh conduct. 
Plaintiff's most serious objections go to the trial court's 
instructions on causation. He contends that the trial court 
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erred in instructing the jury on burden of proof by over-
emphasizing the burden on him and by refusing to instruct 
adequately on the doctrine of Summers v. Tice, 33 Ca1.2d 80 
[199 P .2d 1, 5 A.L.R.2d 91]. In that case two defendants 
negligently discharged shotguns in the direction of the plain-
tiff, who was injured by a shQt from one of the guns. He 
could not determine from which gun the shot came. We hE'ld 
that it was not reasonablE' under these circumstances to require 
plaintiff to show the cause of his injury. The burden fell on 
each defendant to show that his negligence had not caused it 
If neither defendant could show that he had not caused the 
injury, both were liable. 
The rule of Summers v. Tice applies to the facts of the 
present case. The jury could have found that defendants 
Greenley, Rutkowski, and Alameda were all negligent, or that 
anyone of them was negligent. It might well have been unable 
to determine, however, which defendant's negligence caused 
plaintiff's injuries. They might have been caused by Rut-
kowski's negligently running into him, or by the collision 
between the vehicles of Greenley and Alameda. As in the 
Summers case, plaintiff could not identify the cause of his 
injuries. 
The trial court gave the following instruction: 
"When two or more persons by their acts are possibly the 
sole cause of a harm, and the plaintiff has introduced evidence 
that one of the two or more persons is culpable, then the 
defendant has the burden of proving that the other person or 
persons were the sale cause of the harm. 
"The real reason for the rule that each joint tort feasor 
is responsible for the whole damage is the practical unfairness 
of denying the injured person redress simply because he can- . 
not prove how much damage each did, when it is certain that 
between them they did all; let them be the one to apportion 
it among themselves. Since, then, the difficulty of proof is 
the reason, the rule should apply whenever the harm has 
plura] causes, and not merely when they acted in conscious 
concert. "2 
Other instructions, however, foreclosed the application of 
tIt Bhould be noted that this instruction erroneously suggests that 
when one of several defendants is known to have caused the plaintiff's 
injury, but it cannot be determined which, the burden of proof on the 
issue of causation is on all the defendants whether or not their negligence 
has been estllhlished. The Summers rule is based on the policy that it 
is preferable to hold liahle a negligent defendant who did not in fact 
cause the injury than to deny an innorent plaintiff any remedy when it 
ClUlDot be determined whieb of the defendants is responsible for the harm 
) 
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the Summers rule. The trial court repeatedly instructed the 
jury on plaintiff's burden of proof and categoricaBy stated 
that if the conflicting probabilities are equal or the evidence 
is equally balanced on the issue of negligence or proximate 
cause, plaintiff failed to fulfill his burden of proof. These 
instructions served to nullify the single instruction on the 
rule of the Summers case. There is no merit in defendants' 
contention that plaintiff invited the error by offering instruc-
tions, which were refused, similar to those uffered by defend-
ants. Plaintiff's refused instructions on burden of proof were 
not phrased in categorical terms, and their apt reference to 
the other instructions would have enabled the jury to inter-
pret them as subject to the Summers exception. 
The trial court also erred in giving the following instruc-
tion on intervening cause: 
"As you have been instructed, one of the questions we 
must decide in finding whether or not one person is liable for 
injury to another, is whether or not the conduct in question 
was a proximate cause of the injury in question. This inquiry 
may involve the conduct of two or more persons acting inde-
pendently and at different times. To explain the problem pre-
sented by such a situation, I shall refer to the person whose 
conduct came first in point of time as the first actor and to 
the other person as the second actor. If the first actor foresaw, 
or by ex.ercising ordinary care would have seen, that a second 
actor probably would conduct himself as the second actor 
actually did, and also that the combination of the first actor's 
conduct and the second actor's conduct probably would cause 
injury to a third person, and if the combined conduct did so 
result, then each actor's conduct was a concurring proximate 
cause of the injury-although, of course, neither would be 
liable unless his conduct was negligent. But if the first actor's 
conduct alone did not cause the injury, anil if a combination 
of results such as I have mentioned was not foreseen by him 
as a probability, and was not so foreseeable in the exercise 
of ordinary care, then the first actor may not be held liable 
for any injury of which the second actor's conduct was a 
proximate cause or which may now appear to have resulted 
from the combined conduct of both." (Substantially identi· 
cal with BAJI, 4th ed., No. l04-C.2.) 
but it appears that one of them was. Thi~ poli~y olJ\'iou~ly r()mpel~ tli" 
plaintiff first to show that a defendant who may h:l\'e caused the iIJjnry 
was negligent, Ilnd this instruction fn j]pd to make thi~ elenr. ThE' error 
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This instruction is riddled with error. It begins inno-
cently enough to speak of the foreseeability of conduct that 
may combine with antecedent negligence to produce injury. 
It then lurches violently into what the actors actually did, 
thus stating the erroneous rule that the identical consequences 
must have been foreseeable as a probability (Werkman v. 
Bowar.l Zink Corp., 97 Cal.App.2d 418,425 [218 P.2d 43].) 
Nor is the concept of probability rescued from limbo b;\' 
definition. The jury could infer from the instruction that 
the injury must be foreseeable as more probable than not or 
that there must be at least a substantial chance of injury. 
It may be negligence, however, to create the risk of even a 
slight possibility of injury if a reasonably prudent man would 
not do so. One may be negligent in not looking before crossing 
a railroad track even though trains are infrequent. The rule 
extends to foreseeable risks arising out of possible intervt"nin~ 
conduct of third persons. Thus, in the present CBI'W, if 
Greenley was negligent in blocking the highway, it would 
be because a reasonably prudent man would foresee the risk 
of injury from the intervening conduct of other motorists. 
The occurrence of injury from intervening conduct that 
should have been foreseen, whether as a probability or as a 
possibility, would not insulate Greenley from liability. 
(McEvoy v. American Pool Corp., 32 Ca1.2d 295, 299 [195 
P.2d 783] ; see Restatement, Torts, § 449.) 
The instruction, however, could lead the jury to suppose 
that the conduct of Rutkowski or Alameda served to relieve 
Greenley of any liability for placing his car partially acrOSN 
two lanes of the highway even if they found he was negligent 
in so doing. The jury may have concluded that a reasonably 
prudent man would not have incurred the risks that Greenley 
incurred on the ground that the possibility of harm from 
the intervening' conduct of other motorists, even though un· 
likely, should have been avoided. They may also have con· 
eluded, however, that it was unlikely that Rutkowski and 
Alameda would act as they did and absolved Greenley of 
liability for negligence solely because the conduct of Rut-
kowski or Alameda or both was also a cause of plaintiff's 
injury. Under these circumstances an instruction on inter-
vening cause had no place in the case. Greenley was either 
negligent in failing to anticipate and guard against the con· 
duct of other motorists or he was not. If he was, the occur· 
rence of that conduct, even if improbable, would not defeat 
liability, and by inviting the jury to iind otherwise, the in-
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Itruction gave Greenley the benefit of a defense to which be 
was not entitled. 
It is also contended that it was error to give an instruction 
on unavoidable accident. That question is pending in another 
case, and it is not necessary to consider it here in view of 
the errors that have already been discussed. 
There was enough evidence in the present case to support 
a verdict for plaintiff. There is no way of knowing whether 
the verdict was based on a finding that his own negligence 
contributed to his injuries, on findings that none of the defend-
ants were negligent, on findings that plaintiff had not estab-
lished that the negligence of any defendant ,'aused his injury, 
or, in the case of Greenley, on a finding that the conduct of 
Rutkowski or Alameda or both prevented Greenley's negli-
gence from being a proximate cause of the injury. The error 
in giving repeated instructions on plaintiff's burden of proof 
that foreclosed the application of the rule of Summers v. Pice, 
supra, coupled with the fact that there was no direct evidence 
as to how plaintiff was injured, could have led to erroneous 
findings that plaintiff had not sustained his burden of proof 
on the issue of causation. The instruction permitting the jury 
to find for Greenley on the defense of intervening cause, 
although there was no evidence to support this defense, 
coupled with the fact that the instruction erroneously sug-
gested to the jury that the issue should be resolved in Green-
ley's favor, could also have led to the verdict in his favor. 
Accordingly, it is impos.c~ible to determine whether the verdict 
was based on correct· instructions on the issues of negligence 
and contributory negligence, on erroneous instructions on the 
burden of proof on causation or, in the case of Greenley, on 
the erroneous determination of a question of law improperly 
left to the jury. Under these circumstances it has heretofore 
been settled that the error is prejudicial. (Miller v. Peters, 
37 Ca1.2d 89, 95 [230 P.2d 803] ; Clement v. State Reclama-
tion Board, 35 Cal.2d 628, 644 [220 P.2d 897] ; Edwards v. 
Freeman, 34 Ca1.2d 589, 594 [212 P.2d 883]; Buehotter v. 
Follett, 27 Ca1.2d 765, 770-771 [167 P.2d 193] ; Oettinger v. 
Stewart,24 Ca1.2d 133,140 [148 P.2d 19, 156 A.L.R. 1221].) 
I would reverse the judgment. 
Gibson, C. J., and Carter, J., concurred. 
Appellant?s petition for a rehearing was denied February 
26, 1958 .. Gibson, C. J., Carter, J., and Traynor, J., were of 
the opinion that the petition should be granted. 
